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ALICE IN LEGAL WONDERLAND: 
A CROSS-EXAMINATION OF GENDER, RACE, AND 
EMPIRE IN VICTORIAN LAW AND LITERATURE 
KRISTIN BRANDSER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Alice, in her final adventure in Wonderland, becomes increasingly 
bold during the trial to determine who stole the tarts of the Queen of 
Hearts. Alice knows she is growing back to her true size; she has experi-
enced that "curious sensation" telling her that she is gaining her full per-
sonhood. 1 Despite the Dormouse's warning that she has "no right to grow 
here," in this court of law, Alice decides to stay.2 And what a spectacle 
she makes of herself. She is loud; she literally upsets the jury; she inter-
rupts and talks back to the judge. In fact, she shows no respect for the 
"stuff and nonsense" of the law itself or for any of its representatives: 
"'Who cares for you?' said Alice (she had grown to her full size by this 
time.) 'You're nothing but a pack of cards!' At this the whole pack rose 
up into the air, and came flying down upon her."3 As Alice comes into 
herself, chaos becomes the order of the day, and one senses that Won-
derland's system of justice will never be quite the same. 
In this closing episode of Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865), 
Lewis Carroll dramatizes what was to become an increasingly popular 
Victorian scene: a woman questioning and critiquing the law and claim-
ing a place for herself within its institutions. The first half of Queen 
Victoria's reign witnessed Caroline Norton agitating for a mother's right 
to custody of her children and making minor inroads into a father's ab-
solute rights with passage of the Infant Custody Act of 1839.4 In her 
• Lecturer in Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Assistant Professor, University of Cin-
cinnati College of Law (Fall 2001). B.A., University ofIowa, 1984; J.D., University of Chi-
cago, 1987; Ph.D., University ofIowa (May 2001). I am deeply grateful to Patricia Cain for 
encouraging me to publish this Article and for so generously sharing her time and insights. I 
would also like to thank Garrett Stewart and Teresa Mangum for their helpful comments and 
unstinting support. Finally, I wish to thank the American Association of University Women 
Educational Foundation for supporting research for this Article with an American Fellowship. 
I LEWIS CARROLL, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
LEWIS CARROLL 17,117 (Random House 1936). 
21d. at 118. 
31d. at 129. 
4 Infant Custody Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 54 (Eng.). This Act made it possible for a 
Court of Chancery "to award mothers custody of their children under the age of seven and 
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1854 pamphlet English Laws for Women in the Nineteenth Century, 
Norton put on display the harsh realities of coverture, the legal fiction 
that took as its basic premise that, by marriage, the husband and wife 
became one person-the husband.5 While Norton argued that the law did 
not sufficiently protect women, Barbara Leigh Smith went much further 
in her 1854 publication, A Brief Summary in Plain English of the Most 
Important Laws of England Concerning Women, making clear that cov-
erture must be completely abolished for there to be any possibility of 
equality between men and women.6 Norton, Smith, Bessie Parkes, and 
Mary Howitt were among a group of women active in the mid-1850s 
controversies surrounding married women's property and divorce law 
reform.7 All were greatly distressed by the Divorce and Matrimonial 
access to their children under sixteen." MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, FEMINISM, MARRIAGE, 
AND THE LAW IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 1850-1895, at 25 (1989). Norton was responsible 
for the introduction of this legislation, and her efforts have been acknowledged as very 
influential in getting this Act passed. Id. 
S The definition of coverture in Blackstone's Commentaries clarifies a wife's "non-
existence" under the law: 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being 
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband, under whose wing, pro-
tection, and cover, she performs every thing ... and her condition during her mar-
riage is called her coverture. 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 441 (George 
Sharswood ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1861) (1765). 
6 Norton claimed to have no problem with the law treating husband and wife as "one" 
so long as they were living together amicably, but when they were "living alienated and in 
a state of separation," the results were "unjust, unfit, and unnatura1." CAROLINE NORTON, 
English Laws for Women in the Nineteenth Century, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF CAROLINE 
NORTON 167 (James O. Hoge & Jane Marcus eds., Scholars' Facsimiles 1978) (n.d.). Quite 
conservative in her published views, Norton asserts, "[ w ]hat I write, is written in no spirit 
of rebellion; it puts forward no absurd claim of equality; it is simply an appeal for protec-
tion." Id. at 2. However, as Mary Poovey has argued, the very act of making a public ap-
peal was radical at the time, and her transformation "from the silent sufferer of private 
wrongs into an articulate spokesperson in the public sphere" worked to challenge "the 
entire ideological order that the legal and sexual double standard supported." MARY 
POOVEY, UNEVEN DEVELOPMENTS: THE IDEOLOGICAL WORK OF GENDER IN MID-
VICTORIAN ENGLAND 64-65 (1988). See SHANLEY, supra note 4, at 29-32 (discussing 
Smith's pamphlet, A BRIEF SUMMARY IN PLAIN ENGLISH OF THE MOST IMPORTANT LAWS 
IN ENGLISH CONCERNING WOMEN). 
7 Norton created a great stir with the publication of A Letter to the Queen on Lord 
Chancellor Cranworth's Marriage and Divorce Bill (1855). CAROLINE NORTON, A Letter 
to the Queen on Lord Chancellor Cranworth's Marriage and Divorce Bill, ill SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF CAROLINE NORTON, supra note 6, at 58. Critiquing provisions of the pro-
posed bill that allowed men to divorce adulterous wives but only allowed women to sepa-
rate from adulterous husbands, Norton highlighted the injustice of this unequal treatment 
with scathing irony: 
"[I]t is not good for MAN to be alone,"-but extremely good for woman. Hard 
that a husband should not divorce an adulterous wife! Hard that he should not 
form a "purer connection!" Hard (though he has a career and occupations out of 
his own home), that a second chance of domestic happiness should not again greet 
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Causes Act of 1857.8 Although the Act made it possible to obtain a di-
vorce in England·without a special act of Parliament, it also legislated a 
double standard by allowing a man to obtain a divorce upon proof of his 
wife's infidelity, whereas a woman had to prove her husband's infidelity 
plus incest, bigamy, or gross physical cruelty.9 In the 1870s and 1880s, despite numerous setbacks, feminists such 
as Elizabeth Wolstenholme, Elizabeth Gloyne, Lydia Becker, Jessie 
Boucherett, Frances Power Cobbe, and Josephine Butler worked tire-
lessly to reform the laws affecting married women's property.lO They 
achieved limited success with the Married Women's Property Act of 
1870, followed more than a decade later by the more comprehensive 
Married Women's Property Act of 1882.0 Cobbe was also very instru-
mental in the passage of the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878, which of-
him!-But not the least hard that his weaker partner, elevated, according to Mr. 
Gladstone, to an equality with him, since the Christian advent,-she, who if she 
has not a home has nothing-should be left stranded and wrecked on the barren 
sands, at the foot of the world's impassive and impassable rocks. [d. 
Parkes and Howitt joined Smith in her efforts to amend married women's property laws; 
they became involved in divorce reform when the legal issues were linked in the parlia-
mentary debates of 1856 and 1857. SHANLEY, supra note 4, at 32-35. 
8 Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857,20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (Eng.). 
9 [d. The 1857 Act included certain provisions that helped women escape the strictures 
of coverture. For example, if a woman was granted a separation decree, she was treated as 
afeme sole (an unmarried woman) with respect to her property and contracts. Also, if she 
was deserted by her husband, she could go before a local magistrate and receive an order 
to control her earnings as a feme sole. In 1857, Smith, Parkes, Anna Murphy, and Anne 
Jameson started The Englishwoman's Journal, which became the official paper of the bur-
geoning women's movement. Norman St. John-Stevas, Women in Public Law, in A CEN-
TURY OF FAMILY LAW 261 (R.H. Graveson & P.R. Crane eds., 1957). 
10 While the word "feminist" did not come into use in England until the 1890s, it is a 
fitting term for these women activists who were seeking increased rights and roles for 
women in law and society. See THE COMPACT OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 579 (2d ed. 
1991). 
11 Under the Married Women's Property Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.), a wife 
was entitled to keep her own wages and earnings made after marriage and passage of this 
law. Property belonging to her prior to marriage, however, was her separate property only 
if so agreed to by her husband in writing. She was entitled to keep personal property as one 
of the next of kin of an intestate or by the specific bequest of money (but only up to £200). 
The law did not address at all the limitations on a married woman's own testamentary 
powers. See generally LEE HOLCOMBE, WIVES AND PROPERTY: REFORM OF THE MARRIED 
WOMEN'S PROPERTY LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 166-83 (1983) (discussing 
the legislative history of this Act, as well as why it was declared a "legislative abortion" in 
its final form). Under the much broader Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45 & 46 
Vict., c. 75 (Eng.), a married woman was considered to have the rights of a feme sole with 
respect to acquiring, holding, and disposing by will or otherwise of her separate property. 
Her separate property included all real and personal property that belonged to her prior to 
marriage, as well as her wages and earnings acquired after marriage. Married women were 
also granted the right to enter into contracts and to sue on their own behalf. See DOROTHY 
M. STETSON, A WOMAN'S ISSUE: THE POLITICS OF FAMILY LAW REFORM IN ENGLAND 15 
(1982) (discussing "the political influence of feminists on the development of divorce and 
matrimonial property law in England"). See generally HOLCOMBE, supra at 184-205 (de-
scribing the legislative history of the 1882 Act). 
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fered much needed protection for women from domestic abuse. 12 From 
1869 to 1886, Butler devoted most of her seemingly unlimited energy to 
the campaign to repeal the Contagious Diseases Acts. 13 
Victorian-era women were exerting much political influence, and 
were fortunate to be helped by male members of Parliament such as John 
Stuart Mill, Richard Monkton Milnes, and Jacob Bright.14 Efforts were 
made to eliminate the need for exclusive reliance on these "middlemen," 
however, as women strove to impact the law more directly-by voting, 
by being elected to public offices, and by becoming members of the legal 
profession itself. 
In the first part of this Article, I will examine several legal cases in 
which women sought entry into law and politics. These cases illuminate 
how the common law Gudge-made law) sometimes really was law made 
up by judges. While professing their impartiality, Victorian judges 
greatly influenced women's legal roles (by ruling they could not have 
any). I will then engage in a "cross-examination" of the representations 
of two surprising nineteenth-century characters-female judges, one 
fictional and one real: She-Who-Must-Be-Obeyed, or Ayesha, from Rider 
Haggard's 1887 novel She; and the real-life missionary, Mary Slessor, 
who was the first woman appointed as a magistrate in the British Em-
pire.15 I use the term cross-examination in two interrelated ways. First, as 
in a legal proceeding, in which a cross-examination provides an opportu-
nity to clarify or discredit testimony that is offered on direct examination. 
It is a method of probing gaps and openings in the direct testimony-
places where it is possible and necessary to bring out important unstated, 
but related, issues (whether or not they have been omitted intentionally) 
in order to reveal a more complete story. 
12 Matrimonial Causes Act, 1878,41 & 42 Vict., c. 19 (Eng.). 
13 Parliament passed the first Contagious Diseases Acts in 1864 and 1866 as "sanita-
tion measures," designed to control the spread of venereal disease among enlisted men. 
JUDITH R. WALKOWITZ, PROSTITUTION AND VICTORIAN SOCIETY: WOMEN, CLASS, AND 
THE STATE 1 (1980). The Acts provided that plain-clothes "medical police" could appre-
hend any woman suspected of being a common prostitute and order her to submit to a 
genital exaInination to deterInine if she was infected. ld. at 2. If a woman refused to be 
exaInined, she was taken to a magistrate who could order her to submit to the examination 
under threat of imprisonment for failure to comply. Women who were found to be diseased 
were subject to involuntary confinement in hospitals until they were cured. When released, 
they were presented with certificates, verifying their status as disease-free women. See id. 
(discussing the social history of these Acts and the repeal movement). 
14 Thomas Talfourd introduced the Infant Custody Bill in 1839. SHANLEY, slIpra note 
4, at 25. Richard Monkton Milnes was supportive of many women's issues, including the 
reform of married women's property laws. ld. at 34. Lords Brougham and Lyndhurst advo-
cated for women's rights during the debates on reform of divorce and property laws. ld. at 
35, 39-40. John Stuart Mill, Jacob Bright, and George Shaw Lefevre (who introduced the 
Married Women's Property Bill in 1868) agreed with Wollstoneholme, Butler, and Cobbe 
on the need to substantially rethink the institution of marriage. ld. at 67. 
15 JAMES BUCHAN, THE EXPENDABLE MARY SLESSOR 138 (1981). 
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Second, by cross-examination, I mean examining texts from multiple 
perspectives. Thus, while my focus will be on Victorian representations 
of women, law, and power, my cross-examination will also take into ac-
count the imperial context in which they were set. In reading these texts 
that cross continents, I also will explore the intersections of gender and 
race. Both Ayesha and Slessor exercised legal power in Africa, and my 
analysis explores the ways in which, in the context of Empire, traditional 
ideas about gender were complicated and disrupted by racial politics 
when white women were ruling and judging indigenous people in Africa. 
1. JUDGE-MADE LAW: ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE A GROWING CONCERN 
At this moment the King, who had been for some time busily 
writing in his note-book, called out "Silence!" and read out from 
his book "Rule Forty-two. All persons more than a mile high to 
leave the court." 
Everybody looked at Alice. 
"I'm not a mile high," said Alice. 
"You are," said the King. 
"Nearly two miles high," added the Queen. 
"Well, I sha'n't [sic] go, at any rate," said Alice: "besides, 
that's not a regular rule: you invented it just now." 
"It's the oldest rule in the book," said the King. 
"Then it ought to be Number One," said Alice. 
The King turned pale, and shut his note-book hastily. 
-Alice's Adventures in Wonderland l6 
Flustered by the threateningly large presence of Alice in his court-
room, the King (who sits as judge in this proceeding) tries his best to 
make her leave. From his position of authority, he declares the law, 
which, it appears, he just made up. When Alice gets nowhere disputing 
the facts (she is not a mile high), she questions the law itself. At this 
point, the King confidently invokes precedent ("It's the oldest rule in the 
book"), but it is not at all lost on Alice that this argument makes no 
sense. 
When women started to claim their right to be in the world of law, to 
make and interpret law in both legislatures and courtrooms, judges found 
themselves stumbling, like the King, for applicable rules to keep them 
out. The "trouble" arguably started in England in 1866 when Barbara 
Leigh Smith Bodichon and several fellow feminists collected 1499 sig-
natures on a petition for women's suffrageY John Stuart Mill presented 
16 CARROLL, supra note 1, at 124-25. 
17 SHANLEY, supra note 4, at 51. 
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this petition to the House of Commons in 1866, and in 1867, he intro~ 
duced an amendment to the Representation of the People Act ("Repre~ 
sentation Act").18 This effort to give women the right to vote in national 
elections was rejected, with "every conceivable argument, many of them 
contradictory ... employed to defeat the amendment."19 
In several parts of England, however, women householders regis~ 
tered to vote. When the names of 5347 women were excluded from the 
lists of voters in the borough of Manchester, these women took the matter 
to court.20 Having to make their arguments within acceptable legal 
frameworks, in Chorlton v. Lings21 they contended first that women his~ 
torically did have the right to vote and that no subsequent legislation had 
taken that right away, and second (alternatively) that the 1867 Represen~ 
tation Act had conferred the right to vote if women did not possess it be~ 
fore.22 This latter argument was based on the applicability of Lord 
Brougham's Act, which provided that "in all Acts Words importing the 
Masculine Gender shall be deemed to include females, unless the con~ 
trary ... is expressly provided."23 Powerful ethical and philosophical ar~ 
guments (such as that the fundamental principle underlying the Repre~ 
sentation Act was that there should be no taxation without representa~ 
tion) had to be "fit" into those arguments deemed legaUy relevant. 
As Chief Justice Bovill made clear in the opening remarks of his 
opinion in Chorlton, consideration of nonlegal arguments would be most 
inappropriate: "It is quite unnecessary to consider the general question of 
whether it is desirable that women should possess the franchise of voting 
at the election of members of [PJarliament. What we have to determine 
is, whether by law they now possess that right."24 The court proceeded to 
find that they did not, concluding that under the common law, women had 
been and still were legally incapacitated from voting, and that if the leg~ 
islature had intended to make such an important alteration in the personal 
qualifications for voting in the 1867 Representation Act they would not 
have used the word "man" in the relevant provisions.25 
18 The Representation of the People Act, 1867,30 & 31 Vict., c. 102 (Eng.). This Act 
gave the vote to borough householders, extending the franchise "to virtually all English 
men except agricultural day-labourers." SHANLEY, supra note 4, at 51. 
19 St. 10hn-Stevas, supra note 9, at 263. St. 10hn-Stevas summarizes these arguments 
as follows: "Women didn't want the vote: women did want it and would dominate the 
country: women wouldn't use the vote if it were given to them: the amendment gave them 
too much: the amendment gave them too little: the country would be at the mercy of femi-
nine caprice, etc." [d. 
20 Mary Abbott claimed that she was qualified and entitled to be placed on the list of 
voters. When the Revising Barrister for the borough of Manchester held that she was not 
so entitled, she appealed the decision to the Court of Common Pleas. The appeals of 5346 
other women were consolidated. Chorlton v. Lings, 4 L.R.-C.P. 374, 374-75 (1868). 
214 L.R.-C.P. 374 (1868). 
22 [d. at 375. 
23 Lord Brougham's Act, 1850, 13 & 14 Vict., c. 21, § 4 (Eng.). 
24 Chorlton, 4 L.R.-C.P. at 382. 
25 The attorney for the women argued that if the legislators had intended to exclude 
HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 227 2001
2001] Alice in Legal Wonderland 227 
While women were thus foreclosed from voting on a national level, 
the Municipal Corporations (Franchise) Act of 1869 gave women the 
right to vote in local elections on the same terms as men.26 This right was 
gained from a late-night amendment offered by Jacob Bright; however, 
few seemed bothered by women's exercise of this municipal franchise, 
most likely because these elections primarily impacted issues closely 
associated with women's "appropriate" sphere (such as local schools, and 
care of the poor and elderly).2J 
When Lady Sandhurst ran and was elected a county councillor by a 
clear majority, however, the Court of the Queen's Bench Division held 
that the right to vote in a local election did not grant to women a corre-
sponding right to run for office. The applicable Municipal Corporations 
Act provided that "every person shall be qualified to be elected and to be 
a councillor who is, at the time of the election, qualified to elect to the 
office of councillor."28 However, the court determined that the word "per-
son" as used in this provision did not include women (even while agree-
ing that there were places in the Act where "person" and even "he" had 
to be read to also mean "she").29 Therefore, the election of Lady Sand-
hurst was declared void, the votes for her thrown out, and the defeated 
candidate (who had brought the suit in the first place) deemed duly 
elected. 
The judgment in Sandhurst was upheld on appeal. Expressing com-
monplace judicial reverence for what (and who) had gone before, one of 
the appellate judges, citing the Chorlton case, stated, "I take it that by 
neither the common law nor the constitution of this country from the be-
ginning of the common law until now can a woman be entitled to exer-
cise any public function. Willis, J., stated so in that case [Chorlton], and 
a more learned judge never lived."30 
Soon thereafter, another woman was elected to the London Council. 
In order to take advantage of a provision in the applicable statute that an 
election not questioned for one year is deemed valid, she waited one year 
to act and vote as a member of the council. While the court in De Souza 
v. Cobden3' held that this validity provision was inapplicable to the elec-
tion of a woman, it had no problem holding her liable under the penalty 
women, they would have used the words "male persons" (which had been used in a provi-
sion of a related act) rather than "man," which, "by the express provision of Lord 
Brougham's Act, includes women." [d. at 379. 
26 Municipal Corporations (Franchise) Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 55 (Eng.). 
27 SHANLEY, supra note 4, at 109. School boards were created in 1870 by Forster's 
Education Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 75 (Eng.), and women were entitled to vote for and 
serve as members pursuant to this Act. Elizabeth Garrett was the first woman elected to a 
school board. In 1871, Mrs. Nassau was the first woman appointed as a poor law inspector. 
St. John-Stevas, supra note 9, at 273. 
28 Municipal Corporations (Franchise) Act, 1869, 32 & 33 Vict., c. 55 (Eng.). 
29 Beresford-Hope v. Sandhurst, 23 Q.B.D. 79,81-82 (1889). 
30 [d. at 95 (Esher, J.). 
31 1 Q.B. 687 (1891). 
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section of the same statute-even though, to do so, it had to interpret the 
word "he" to also mean "she."32 
The inconsistent wordplay in these "person" cases-with "man" 
sometimes meaning "person," "person" sometimes meaning "he," and 
"he" sometimes meaning "she"-made it uncomfortable to decide a case 
solely on the basis of the "clear" meaning of the statute. Thus, the com-
mon law was cited to lend credibility and authority to these word games. 
Citing the common law not only gave a judge the backing of the law's 
glorified past, it also excused him from considering present-day realities; 
he could claim to be bound by the decisions of the judges who had gone 
before him. But as Albie Sachs and Joan Hoff Wilson explain, much of 
the common law's venerated "history" is really fiction: 
In the seventeenth century the common law had been yoked to a 
principle of the fundamental rights of the people of England as a 
weapon to challenge the divine right of the Kings of England. It 
drew its doctrinal strength from a claim to have existed since 
time immemorial, having its roots in an antiquity that predated 
the prerogative rights of the kings. In order to establish this an-
cient origin, a history was invented by the judges. This retro-
spectively created history was almost entirely fictional, but so 
strong was the need of the judges to assert the supremacy of the 
common law and the concomitant idea of uninterrupted custom, 
that contrary facts were simply ignored or treated as irrelevant. 
Essentially this fictionalized history represented a projection 
into the past of the current world-view of the judges. Coke was 
the leading exponent of this asserted antiquity, and it was 
Coke's manufactured views that were relied upon for the next 
three centuries as having set out immemorial custom.33 
It was the fiction of the uninterrupted custom of women not holding 
public or political office that ultimately. decided most of these "person" 
cases. Evidence to the contrary was ignored or deemed too scanty or in-
substantial to call into question a grand common-law tradition of exclu-
sion. Hence, in response to several fifteenth-century examples of women 
participating in elections provided by counsel to the women in the 
Chorlton case, the court responded: 
It is quite true that a few instances have been brought before us 
where in ancient times, viz. in the reigns of Henry IV., Henry V., 
32 [d. Women were not able to be elected as county or borough councillors until 1907, 
with passage of the Qualification of Women Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 48 (Eng.). St. John-
Stevas, supra note 9, at 274. 
33 ALBIE SACHS & JOAN HOFF WILSON, SEXISM AND THE LAW: A STUDY OF MALE 
BELIEFS AND LEGAL BIAS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 43-44 (1978). 
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and Edward VI., women appear to have been parties to the re-
turns of members of parliament; and possibly other instances 
may be found in early times, not only of women having voted, 
but also of their having assisted in the deliberations of the leg-
islature .... But these instances are of cpmparatively little 
weight, as opposed to uninterrupted usage to the contrary for 
several centuries; and what has been commonly received and 
acquiesced in as the law raises a strong presumption of what the 
law is .... 34 
229 
This "acquiescence" continued as judges strove to characterize inter-
ruptions as anything but, with Lord Esher in De Souza, for example, de-
termining that "by the common law of England women are not in general 
deemed capable of exercising public functions, though there are certain 
exceptional cases where a well-recognized custom to the contrary had 
become established, as in the case of overseers of the pqor."35 The court 
in lex-Blake v. Senatus36 (the case in which Sophia Jex-Blake and others 
sought the right to study and receive degrees in medicine from the Uni-
versity of Edinburgh) dismissed the notorious Victorian "interruption," 
the Queen, as an "illustrious and solitary exception" to the well-
established common law rule.37 In this way, "the anti-feminism of one 
generation of judges was carried by the common law to the anti-feminism 
of another generation"-all under the guise of judicial neutrality.38 The 
mantra "women have always been excluded from public office" became 
one of the law's "truths"-one of the oldest rules in the book. But like 
the mile-high rule encountered by Alice, it had been made up. 
While the courts would not address the issue of whether a woman 
was a "person" under the statutes governing admittance into the legal 
profession until 1913, women were actively considering legal careers as 
early as the 1870s. In 1876, a woman first applied to sit for the solicitors' 
examination, but was refused.39 The aspirations of another "young lady 
candidate" were foiled in 1879 when the Law Society, that "ungallant 
body" as the Solicitors' lournal somewhat smugly reported, "definitely 
34 Chorlton v. Lings, 4 L.R.-C.P. 374, 383 (1868) (Bovill, J.). The key role of Coke is 
made clear in the opinion of one judge who affirms that: 
[T]he opinion of Lord Coke, who clearly considered the law to be that women 
were disqualified at common law, would under any circumstances be of great 
authority: but, when it is supported by centuries of usage quite in accordance with 
his statement, the authority becomes such as it would be impossible for this Court 
to disregard. [d. at 396 (Keating, J.) (citation omitted). 
35 De Souza, 1 Q.B. at 691. 
36 11 M. 784 (1873). 
37 [d. at 832. 
38 SACHS & WILSON, supra note 33, at 44. 
39 [d. at 171-72. 
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said that they do not feel themselves at liberty to accept the notice of any 
woman."40 That same year, ninety-two women signed a petition request-
ing admission to the law lectures at Lincoln's Inn. They were told "that 
in the opinion of this Bench it is not expedient that Women should be 
admitted to the Lectures of the Professors appointed by the Council of 
Legal Education."41 
In the midst of these pronoun controversies and inexpedient re-
quests, the young lawyer Rider Haggard penned one of the most popular 
novels of his day-an imperial adventure story about an unprecedented 
ruling queen and judge who is unambiguously "She."42 
II. SHE-WHO-MUST-BE-OBEYED: QUEEN OF THE IMAGINATION 
The novel She is the story of three Englishmen who penetrate into 
the depths of a feminized African landscape and discover an all-powerful 
queen, She-Who-Must-Be-Obeyed.43 The novel consists of a first-person 
M) Lady Lawyers, SOLICITORS' J., Dec. 20, 1879, at 139. Lawyers in England were (and 
still are) either solicitors or barristers. In the nineteenth century, a solicitor was literaUy, as 
Birks describes him in his aptly titled history Gentlemen of the Law, "the practical man of 
affairs who looks after the day-to-day management of legal business, the man to whom the 
layman takes his troubles." MICHAEL BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 3 (1960). Barristers 
were primarily advocates, with the exclusive right to plead cases in the superior courts. 
GeneralIy speaking, tlJe services of a barrister were retained by a solicitor rather thnn by 
the client directly. To train as a solicitor, one had to be articled to a practicing solicitor, 
serve an apprenticeship (typicalIy for five years), and pass examinations administered by 
the Law Society. [d. at 2-3. While dated, Birks' book provides a thorough and fascinating 
history of the "character" of the solicitor. 
41 5 THE BLACK BOOKS: THE RECORDS OF THE HONORABLE SOCIETY OF LINCOLN'S 
INN 178 (Sir Ronald Roxburgh ed., Lincoln's Inn 1968) (1845-1914). Barristers (as op-
posed to solicitors) are "calIed to the Bar." RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 38 (1988). After being admitted to one of the four Inns of Court 
(Gray's Inn, Lincoln's Inn, the Inner Temple, or the Middle Temple), a law student had to 
"keep terms;' evidenced by his dining in the hall of his Inn a specified number of times. 
For three years, graduates of English universities were required to dine twelve times each 
year, and all other would-be barristers were required to dine twenty-four times each year. 
This represented a significant expense, especialIy for those who had to travel to London. 
[d. Since 1872, students have also been required to pass a Bar examination. Law lectures 
were given by the Council of Legal Education (established by the four Inns in 1852), al-
though many students engaged the services of private "crammers." [d. at 50. Judges were 
called from the ranks of barristers. BIRKS, supra note 40, at 2. 
42 The novel She sold a nearly record-breaking 30,000 copies within a few months. 
Sandra M. Gilbert, Rider Haggard's Heart of Darkness, in COORDINATES: PLACING SCI-
ENCE FICTION AND FANTASY 124 (George E. Slusser et al. eds., 1983). Gilbert contends the 
terse title suggests tlJat the book might be "an abstract treatise on the female gender or a 
fictive exploration of the nature of womanhood." [d. 
43 H. RIDER HAGGARD, SHE 56 (Daniel Karlin ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1887). 
As they make tlJeir way into the interior of the continent, the narrator Holly erotically de-
scribes the climax of an African evening: 
The moon went slowly down in chastened loveliness, she departed like some 
sweet bride into her chamber, and long veil-like shadows crept up the sky through 
which the stars peeped shyly out. Soon, however, they too began to pale before 
the splendour in tlJe east, and tlJen the quivering footsteps of dawn came rushing 
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manuscript of one of these travelers, Ludwig Horace Holly, which is pre-
sented to the reader by an anonymous editor as a "record," or testimony 
concerning "one of the most wonderful and mysterious experiences ever 
undergone by mortal men."44 The editor counsels the reader in jury-like 
fashion "to form his own judgment on the facts before him."45 Before 
their journey, the three travelers live together in a university setting, an 
all-male family in an almost exclusively masculine world.46 In light of the 
novel's title, however, it is not surprising that the opening remarks about 
each character set forth his feelings about women. 
Holly, a Cambridge scholar in his forties, has steered away from 
women since he fell in love at the age of twenty. The woman rejected 
him, saying as she stood with him in front of a mirror, "'Now if I am 
Beauty, who are yoU?'''47 The editor of the manuscript corroborates both 
this appraisal of Holly's appearance ("he reminded me forcibly of a go-
rilla"), as well as Holly's anxious aversion to women ("he was popularly 
supposed to be as much afraid of a woman as most people are of a mad 
dog").48 Holly identifies himself as "a bit of a misogynist."49 
The second Englishman, Leo Vincey, has become the Beauty in 
Holly's life. Holly was appointed Leo's guardian when the boy was five 
years old, and he raised him without any female assistance: "I would 
have no woman to lord it over me about the child, and steal his affections 
from me."50 The editor describes Leo as "a statue of Apollo corne to 
life,"51 and Holly comments that "Beauty and the Beast was what they 
called us when we went out walking together, as we used to do every 
day."52 Holly doesn't seem to mind these epithets when he is the Beast 
beside Leo, possibly because he feels so secure about the relationship: 
"Few sons have been loved as I love Leo, and few fathers know the deep 
and continuous affection that Leo bears to me."53 Leo, however, is not a 
across the newborn blue, and shook the planets from their places. 
Id. Gilbert describes the men's penetration of Africa as follows: "Lifted into litters, the 
explorers yield to a 'pleasant swaying motion' and, in a symbolic return to the womb, they 
are carried up ancient swampy birth-canals into 'a vast cup of earth' that is ruled by She-
Who-Must-Be-Obeyed and inhabited by a people called the Amahaggar." Gilbert, supra 
note 42, at 125. 
44 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 1. 
451d. at 6. 
46 The first lectures at Cambridge given specifically for women were in 1870, and soon 
thereafter women began to be admitted to some of the "men's" lectures. Women were not 
granted degrees from Cambridge until 1948. St. Iohn-Stevas, supra note 9, at 269-70. 
47 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 8. 
481d. at 2. 
491d. at 88. 
50 Id. at 19. 
51/d. at 1. 
521d. at 21. 
531d. at 20. 
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misogynist, and Holly reports having "trouble" with Leo when it comes 
to young women.54 
The third Englishman, Job, is "the suitable male attendant" whom 
Holly had hired to help him care for Leo.55 One of a family of seventeen, 
Job is described as "well-accustomed to the ways of children."56 A comic 
figure, this feminized character displays the fears and concerns of an 
overbearing mother and the moral prudishness of a stereotypical spinster 
aunt. 
Leo is called to the Bar "to pass the time away" until he turns 
twenty-five.57 It is on that birthday that he becomes entitled to his inheri-
tance, an old chest containing an ancient potsherd (a broken piece of 
earthenware) covered in Uncial Greek writing.53 The chest also includes a 
sixteenth-century Latin translation of the potsherd, as well as an English 
translation made by Leo's father. Upon learning from these ancient writ-
ings that a purported source of eternal youth and beauty is to be found in 
a land ruled by She-Who-Must-Be-Obeyed, a queen "having knowledge 
of all things, and life and loveliness that does not die,"59 these three un-
likely adventurers travel to Africa in search of the "rolling Pillar of 
Life."60 
In her article Rider Haggard's Heart of Darkness, Sandra Gilbert 
makes much of the fact that the Amahaggar society described in She is 
matriarcha1.61 As Holly explains: 
[W]omen among the Amahaggar are not only upon terms of per-
fect equality with the men, but are not held to them by any 
binding ties. Descent is traced only through the line of the 
mother, and while individuals are as proud of a long and supe-
rior female ancestry as we are of our families in Europe, they 
54 Id. at 22. 
55Id. at 19. 
56Id. 
57Id. at 22. That it was no trouble for a mediocre male scholar (like Leo) or one with 
little real interest in the profession (like Haggard) to be called to the Bar accentuates the 
injustice of the barriers that kept even the most zealous women from making it into the 
club. Encouraged by his friend Justice Kotze who asked him, "Why not read for the Bar?," 
Haggard embarked on such a course in 1881 as a member of Lincoln's Inn. RIDER HAG-
GARD, 1 THE DAYS OF My LIFE 173, 203 (1926). He was admitted to the Bar in 1885, but 
by 1888 he had given up the practice of law. NORMAN ETHERINGTON, RIDER HAGGARD 7-9 
(1984). His biographer Morton Cohen explains: "Rider Haggard was not destined to serve 
the law long. His whimsical strain made him unsuited for chambers and the routine of legal 
affairs." MORTON N. COHEN, RIDER HAGGARD: HIS LIFE AND WORKS 85 (1960). 
58 Daniel Karlin, Explanatory Notes to H. Rider Haggard. She 318. 320 (Daniel Karlin 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1887). In his notes on the text of She, Karlin defines Uncial 
Greek as "a script comprising large rounded letters (not joined to each other) characteristic 
of early classical manuscripts." Id. 
59 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 30. 
60 Id. at 31. 
61 Gilbert, supra note 42, at 126. 
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never pay attention to, or even acknowledge, any man as their 
father, even when their male parentage IS perfectly well 
known.62 
233 
Gilbert sees this land as a place where "relations between its men and 
women inhabitants are exactly antithetical to those that prevail in normal 
civilized societies" and thus "a realm where what patriarchal culture 
defines as misrule has become rule."63 Specifically, she describes an early 
episode in which the Englishmen's Arab companion, Mahomed, almost 
falls victim to the customary Amahaggar mode of execution (placing a 
red-hot earthen pot on the heads of strangers) as "grotesquely sexual in 
its elaboration of the ways in which female misrule can cause a vessel 
associated with female domesticity to become as deadly as female anat-
omy."64 
A cross-examination of Holly's testimony concerning women's roles 
in this society, however, reveals that, in reality, the women do not rule, 
and that Holly's claim of equality between Amahaggar men and women 
simply is not substantiated by the facts. Each tribe of about seven thou-
sand people is governed by an elected ruler known as a Father and, as 
Holly clarifies, there "is but one titular male parent of each tribe."6s In 
Haggard's fantasy, the language is unambiguous-women cannot be Fa-
thers. As the Amahaggars have no written laws, this rule (like the com-
mon law) is based on custom; however, there is little chance that this es-
tablished precedent will be challenged, for anyone who offends against 
custom will be "put to death by order of the Father"-thus ensuring un-
interrupted acquiescence in the law.66 
Men are also the only armed members of the society, and in almost 
every description of an Amahaggar man, he either is holding his spear or 
has it nearby. Moreover, the men use these weapons to "control" the 
women. Billali, one of the Amahaggar Fathers, describes the position of 
women as follows: '''We worship them ... up to a certain point, till at 
last they get unbearable, which,' he added, 'they do about every second 
generation.'''67 At this point, he explains, "'we rise, and kill the old ones 
as an example to the young ones, and to show them that we are the 
62 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 8l. 
63 Gilbert, supra note 42, at 126. 
MId. As Gilbert explains, "[t]his astonishing mode of execution, a cross between 
cooking and decapitation which seems to have no real anthropological precedent, is such a 
vivid enactment of both castration fears and birth anxieties that it is hardly necessary to 
rehearse all its psychosymbolic overtones." Id. Laura Chrisman argues that this matrilinear 
society, which emphasizes a woman's reproductive role and excludes her from the proc-
esses of production (women are exempt from manual labor), limits her to a domestic func-
tion. Laura Chrisman, The imperial unconscious? Representations of imperial discourse, 
32 CRITICAL Q. 38, 43 (1990). 
6S HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 81 (emphasis added). 
66Id. at 90. 
67Id. at 114. 
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strongest."'68 While women in Britain also were "dying" (or at least suf-
fering) on their pedestals, the Amahaggar women more literally suffered 
their fate of being "worshipped," while remaining powerless.69 
Not surprisingly, in this world of male fantasy, the only power we 
see an Amahaggar woman exercising is the ability to make sexual ad-
vances to the man of her choice. Leo, for example, is embraced almost 
immediately by the beautiful Ustane, and while the moral and prudish 
Job "ejaculated, 'The hussy-well, I never!"', Leo warmly returns Us-
tane's embrace.7o According to Amahaggar custom, this exchange is akin 
to a marriage ceremony, although the arrangement continues only until 
one of the partners wearies of it. While these women do maintain some 
control over their private lives, their actual power appears to be mere 
fancy. 
The Queen of the Amahaggars, however, as Queen Victoria was de-
scribed in the Jex-Blake case, is an "illustrious and solitary exception" to 
this power structure.71 While the men rise up and kill other older women, 
the two thousand-year-old She, or Ayesha (her real name and what she 
prefers to be called by Holly), has ruled over Amahaggar men and 
women for generations. In fact, she shares much in common with Brit-
ain's real "Great White Queen" Victoria.72 
Queen Victoria similarly was "above the law" in that she was exempt 
from the rules of coverture. As the monarch, Victoria was unique among 
married women. She was not obliged to take her husband's name or to 
hand over her property to him after their marriage; she could enter into 
independent contracts and dispose freely of her own possessions.73 While 
Victoria did not support the efforts of nineteenth-century women to re-
68Id. 
69 Florence Nightingale in Cassandra laments the mental and physical suffering 
women endure as a result of their confinement within the domestic sphere. Florence 
Nightingale, Cassandra, in CASSANDRA AND OTHER SELECTIONS FROM SUGGESTIONS FOR 
THOUGHT 228 (Mary Poovey ed., 1992) (1852). Far from celebrating women's role as 
angel in the house, Nightingale describes the plight of Victorian upper- and middle-class 
women as: 
Id. 
[L]ike the Archangel Michael as he stands upon Saint Angelo in Rome. She has 
an immense provision of wings, which seem as if they would bear her over heaven 
and earth; but when she tries to use them, she is petrified into stone, her feet are 
grown into the earth, chained to the bronze pedestal. 
70 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 81. 
71 Jex-Blake v. Senatus, 11 M. 784, 832 (1873). 
72 Neil Parsons explains that the "term 'Great White Queen' as applied to Queen Victo-
ria (ruled 1837-1901) was put into the mouths of 'native' applicants by British settler rec-
ords around the world and came to be accepted in metropolitan Britain as correct 'Sambo' 
pidgin." NEIL PARSONS, KING KHAMA, EMPEROR JOE, AND THE GREAT WHITE QUEEN: 
VICTORIAN BRITAIN THROUGH AFRICAN EYES, at xvii (1998). 
73 DOROTHY THOMPSON, QUEEN VICTORIA: GENDER AND POWER 125 (1990). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 235 2001
2001] Alice in Legal Wonderland 235 
form the laws of coverture, she maintained an identity, including a legal 
one, of her own.74 
In what Adrienne Munich identifies as "a revealing fantasy of Hag-
gard who had never known another monarch than Victoria and who was 
only six years old when Prince Albert died," both Ayesha and Victoria 
enjoy very long reigns and suffer extensive periods of mourning for their 
male lovers.75 Also, Ayesha tells Holly that her "empire is of the imagi-
nation," which seems an apt description of the immense symbolic power 
Victoria wielded, especially in connection with her empire.76 As Dorothy 
Thompson explains: 
Disraeli's move in creating the title of Empress of India for the 
queen in 1876, and the celebrations of her golden jubilee in 
1887 and diamond jubilee a decade later, meant that there was a 
grand royal event in each of the last three decades of the cen-
tury-events which highlight the growing imperial power of 
Britain.77 
Moreover, a diary entry of one of her granddaughter's friends provides a 
glimpse of the personal hold Victoria had on the country's imagination. 
Visiting Windsor Castle and seeing the light of the Queen's lamp "glow-
ing late into the night," Helene Vacaresco wrote that thinking of that 
"frail little old lady working there and holding in her hands the threads of 
... her vast Empire" filled her "with something like awe."78 Victoria's 
"awesome" symbolic power, however, exceeded the realm of the imagi-
nary: "[B]y the time of her death, the need of a figure on which to focus 
the idea of Britain had become so deeply part of the political scene that 
even republican political leaders feared to challenge it."79 For the sake of 
Empire, the political nature of the Queen's very public role had to be ac-
knowledged.80 
74 In fact, the Queen expressed anti-feminist sentiments such as "[w]e women are not 
made for governing-and if we are good women, we must dislike these masculine occupa-
tions." RICHARD MULLEN & JAMES MUNSON, VICTORIA: PORTRAIT OF A QUEEN 60 (1987). 
Regardless of what she said, however, she was very active in government. Sir Charles 
Dilke, a repUblican detractor of Queen Victoria, complained in 1879, "The Queen does 
interfere ... constantly." THOMPSON, supra note 73, at 121. Thompson explains the 
Queen's political role as follows: "To the end of her life she took an active interest in all 
matters of state, demanded to be consulted and undoubtedly influenced many decisions." 
[d. at 122. 
75 Adrienne Auslander Munich, Queen Victoria, Empire, and Excess, 6 TuLSA STUD. 
IN WOMEN'S LIT. 265, 272 (1987). 
76 HAGGARD, supra note 42, at 175. 
77 THOMPSON, supra note 73, at 117. 
78 MULLEN & MUNSON, supra note 74, at 136 (Helene Vacaresco's comment is quoted 
in Mullen & Munson, but they do not cite the original source). 
79 THOMPSON, supra note 73, at 125. 
80 Thompson comments that "the presence of a female in the highest political position 
in the country had at times given strength, if only by implication, to the arguments of her 
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In the novel, when Holly first comes into Ayesha's presence, he is 
filled with a nameless terror when he feels "the gaze of the unknown be-
ing seeking through and through me" from behind a curtain.81 When he 
turns his gaze upon her, he finds himself linguistically impotent: 
I have heard of the beauty of celestial beings, now I saw it; only 
this beauty, with all its awful loveliness and purity, was evil-at 
least, at the time, it struck me as evil. How am I to describe it? I 
cannot-simply, I cannot! The man does not live whose pen 
could convey a sense of what I saw.82 
In its ambiguity, this is typical of almost all of Holly's descriptions of 
Ayesha. He tries to capture the multiplicity of meanings that she implies, 
but language fails him. He describes her in contradictory terms or 
qualifies his assessments as he does with the afterthought, "at least, at the 
time, it struck me as evil."83 His reference to "at the time" emphasizes the 
fact that he is remembering. So has he changed his mind, deciding that 
she is not evil? It is as if he wants to emphasize his own trouble in com-
ing to terms with the powerful woman that She is and the possibilities 
that She represents. 
After Holly has spent hours discussing classical languages and his-
tory with a charming, witty, and flirtatious Ayesha, she gives a little sob 
when she is reminded of Kallikrates, the man she had loved and mur-
dered two thousand years ago in a jealous rage and for whose return she 
has been waiting since that time. Holly comments, "I saw that after all 
she was only a woman, although she might be a very old one."84 When 
she is only a woman, acting in an acceptable, womanly way, he is no 
longer terrified. 
His assessment of her changes, however, when he sees her the next 
day, not as a languishing beauty, but as a powerful woman presiding over 
a court of law. He is commanded to appear in her courtroom, and there 
witnesses a sight "as strange as any I ever saw, even in that unholy 
land."85 As he stands near the back of the room, taking in the crowd of 
gloomy-looking spectators, there is a cry of "Hiya! Hiya!"86 (meaning 
She! She!), which may have sounded to Holly reminiscent of, but pro-
foundly different from, the familiar call to order, "Hear ye!, Hear yeL" 
The crowd then immediately falls upon the ground in a degrading inver-
female subjects who were seeking greater educational and political opportunities." Id. at 
120. 
81 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 141. 
82 [d. at 155. 
83Id. 
s.! [d. at 157 (emphasis added). 
85 [d. at 173. 
S6 /d. at 170. 
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sion of "all rise."87 Ayesha enters the courtroom following a long proces-
sion of guards and male and female mutes, and then tells Holly to come 
sit at her feet and see her do justice.88 
What follows is a formal court proceeding.89 The prisoners are sum-
moned; Ayesha asks Holly to identify the men who attacked him and his 
companions and then has him testify concerning the attempted murders. 
Holly recounts "the history of the cannibal feast, and of the attempted 
torture of our poor servant [Mahomed]."90 When he finishes, Ayesha calls 
upon Billali to verify Holly's testimony. After the case for the prosecu-
tion has been presented, Ayesha asks if any of the accused would like to 
speak in their own defense. One man asks for mercy, explaining that the 
attack had been made in a sudden fury and that they deeply regretted 
their actions.91 
An intense silence follows this plea, and Holly is struck by the 
strangeness of this entire scene. He finds Ayesha particularly remarkable: 
Then, seated in her barbaric chair above them all, with myself at 
her feet, was the veiled white woman, whose loveliness and 
awesome power seemed to visibly shine about ber like a halo, or 
rather like the glow from some unseen light. Never have I seen 
her veiled shape look more terrible than it did in that space, 
while she gathered herself up for vengeance.92 
Many spectacular scenes in the novel horrify Holly. He witnesses Ayesha 
ritually cursing the long-dead Egyptian wife of Kallikrates, causing a 
white flame of fire to leap up and down with the movements of her body. 
He sees her caressing a two thousand-year-year-old corpse, and later ac-
tually bathing in the fire of the Pillar of Life. But it is in a court of law, 
where "She" sits in judgment, that Holly finds Ayesha most terrifying. 
Ironically, it is in that same space that Ayesha appears to stand in for 
"civilized" white society, in contradistinction to the cannibalistic and 
savage Amahaggars. This scene emphasizes Ayesha's whiteness. In fact, 
swathed as she is from head to foot, whiteness is her only identifiable 
I{/ [d. at 17l. 
88 [d. 
89 A few days after the travelers had arrived in the land of the Amahaggars, Holly, in 
trying to save his servant Mahomed from having the red-hot pot placed on his head and 
then being cooked and eaten, had shot the Amahaggar woman who was holding Mahomed 
and accidentally killed Mahomed at the same time. [d. at 100. A deadly fight had ensued, 
and the Englishmen were saved only when the Amahaggar Father Billali intervened. [d. at 
105. Ayesha had sent orders that the Englishmen (the white men) were to be kept alive, and 
the men who had disobeyed her orders and tried to kill Holly, Leo, and Job were on trial. 
[d. at 170. 
90 [d. at 172. 
91 [d. at 173. 
92 [d. at 174 (emphasis added). 
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feature.93 Ayesha's pose is thoughtful and reflective, while the multitude 
before her are described as groveling upon their stomachs. In this formal 
legal proceeding, with evidence given and corroborated and the defen-
dants given an opportunity to speak, the chaos of the earlier scene gov-
erned by Amahaggar custom (the attempted hot-potting and following 
mayhem) is disciplined. 
While Ayesha's judgment is harsh (the men are condemned to 
death), this outcome should not be all that troubling to Holly, who de-
scribes the defendants as "would-be murderers" and considers them re-
sponsible for the death of Mahomed.94 Also, while it is true that the men 
will be tortured, Holly has emphasized their attempted torture of Ma-
homed in his own testimony. In fact, while Holly professes to make a 
plea for mercy for the prisoners, his narrative suggests that he takes more 
interest in the particular fall of Ayesha's Greek accent than the plight of 
the "knots of evil-doers."95 Soon after the prisoners are taken away, he 
joins Ayesha on a sightseeing tour of the caves of Kor. So what is it that 
made her so terrible to Holly in that space? 
An analysis of Holly's narrative suggests that his horror of Ayesha in 
the courtroom has nothing to do with the fate of the Amahaggars and 
everything to do with her position "above them all." From the time of 
Holly's first acquaintance with Ayesha, he has refused to bow to her 
authority. He is indignant when Billali tells him that he must crawl on his 
hands and knees when in her presence: "I was an Englishman, and why, I 
asked myself, should I creep into the presence of some savage woman 
... ? If once I began to creep upon my knees I should always have to do 
so, and it would be patent acknowledgement of inferiority."96 As an Eng-
lishman, he is confident of his superiority to both Billali, who does creep, 
and to the "savage dusky queen."97 Similarly, in the courtroom scene, 
when Ayesha enters and everyone falls to the ground, Holly recounts that 
he was left stl;inding "like some solitary survivor of a massacre."98 
Thus, when this white woman sits as judge, the seat of judgment be-
comes barbaric and Holly cannot emphasize enough (he tells us three 
times in the course of this short narrative) that he sat "at her feet."99 Un-
like the scenes in which Ayesha unveils for Holly, when all of her power 
is sexual, her power in the courtroom is of a very different nature. AI-
93 This point is emphasized in the illustration that accompanied early editions of the 
text in which Ayesha is mummy-like in appearance. See H. RIDER HAGGARD, SHE: A HIS-
TORY OF ADVENTURE 170-71 (Longmans 1919) (1887). 
94 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 142. 
95 [d. at 173. 
% [d. at 140. 
97 [d. at 138. The associations in the novel between savagery and dark skin are empha-
sized in that Holly no longer refers to Ayesha as savage once he realizes that she is not 
dusky. 
98 [d. at 171. 
99 [d. at 174. 
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though her garb is a bit peculiar, she too closely resembles those "shes" 
seeking power in law and society back in England for her position above 
Holly to be regarded as anything short of terrible. 
A reading which focuses only on issues of women and power in this 
novel, however, would fail to examine what Laura Chrisman describes as 
"the multiple dynamics within the text, of gender, 'race,' and a variety of 
social science discourses, whose intersections are overdetermined by the 
dictates of a highly problematic imperialism."loo Edward Said, describing 
imperialist "structures of attitude and reference," notes the widespread 
(virtually unanimous, Said argues) nineteenth-century beliefs inherent in 
cultural discourse that "subject races should be ruled, that they are sub-
ject races, that one race deserves and has consistently earned the right to 
be considered the race whose main mission is to expand beyond its own 
domain."101 In this context, it is important to explore the meanings of Ay-
esha not only in her role as a powerful ruling judge and queen, but more 
specifically in her role as an imperial and white ruler. 
It is clear that Ayesha is white from the first pages of the novel be-
cause the letter from Leo's father that accompanies the ancient potsherd 
emphasizes this point: "[TJhe people there [in the land of the Amahag-
gars] speak a dialect of Arabic, and are ruled over by a beautiful white 
woman who is seldom seen by them, but who is reported to have power 
over all things living and dead."I02 When Holly first appears before Ay-
esha, the first thing he sees is "a most beautiful white hand (white as 
snow)."!03 Her body is wrapped in a soft, white gauzy material and "one 
could distinctly see the gleam of the pink flesh beneath [these wrap-
pings]."I().I This white queen rules over a people of a different race, a 
darker race. Holly describes the Amahaggars as too dark, or rather too 
yellow, to be Arabs. As one critic comments, "the Amahaggar are por-
trayed as a bastard race, a degenerate survival from the golden age of 
Kor."!05 The travelers learn that Ayesha intervenes to stop wars among the 
Amahaggar tribes.106 In this way, the text suggests that, like the colonies 
of England, the Amahaggar tribes benefit from the rule of their queen. 
The confrontation between the imperial She and the Amahaggar 
Ustane provides a rich context in which to explore the complex dynamics 
of gender, race, and imperialism in the text. When Ayesha hears of the 
attachment between Ustane and Leo (who Ayesha believes is the reincar-
nation of her long lost love Kallikrates), she announces that Ustane must 
100 Chrisman, supra note 64, at 42. 
101 EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 53 (1993). 
102 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 28. 
103 [d. at 142. 
lOt [d. 
IDS David Bunn, Embodying Africa: Woman and Romance in Colonial Fiction, 15 ENG. 
IN AFR. 1,21 (1988). 
106 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 91. 
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die: "'No other woman shall dwell in my Lord's thoughts; my empire 
shall be all my own.'''l07 Holly, however, persuades Ayesha to spare Us-
tane's life. When Ustane explains to Ayesha that Leo is her husband, "'I 
took him according to the custom of our country,''' Ayesha responds that 
Ustane has done evil; she has married a man not of her own race, which 
invalidates the custom.108 As the Amahaggars are a bastardized race, there 
clearly is no truth to this statement. It is yet another example of a made-
up rule. 
And like Alice, Ustane defies authority and refuses to leave, boldly 
daring Ayesha, '''[d]estroy me, then, if thou hast the power!"'109 In a rage, 
Ayesha strikes Ustane on the head, leaving three finger-marks across her 
bronze tresses that are "white as snow."110 Holly staggers back in horror, 
and the marks strike terror in Ustane's heart: "Utterly awed and broken 
down, the poor creature rose, and, marked with that awful mark, crept 
from the room sobbing bitterly."lll While this scene may be read as two 
women fighting over a man, the emphasis on customs and rights in their 
exchange suggests that much more is at stake. Ustane is standing up for 
the integrity of her customs; moreover, she is refusing to let Ayesha deny 
her the only power that she has been granted as a woman in her society-
the power to choose a husband. But the "civilized" Ayesha has no respect 
for "savage" ways, and when an Amahaggar stands up for her customs 
and rights, this imperial queen blasts her into submission with a fierce 
display of white power. A few pages later, when Ustane returns again to 
claim Leo, Ayesha murders her in cold blood.1l2 
While Ustane is presented heroically in this imperial romance, the 
way the Englishmen so easily accept her death is simply shocking. Leo 
and Holly witness the murder, and while Leo immediately springs at Ay-
esha in a rage, moments later, "with the corpse of his dead love [Ustane] 
for an altar, did Leo Vincey plight his troth to her red-handed murdress-
plight it for ever and a day."113 That evening, racked with remorse over 
Ustane's murder, Leo admits an insatiable desire for Ayesha, and Holly 
comments that Leo, despite his shame and grief, would have been mad 
"to entertain the idea of running away from his extraordinary fortune" in 
being the object of Ayesha's devotion. 1l4 In his article Victorians and Af-
ricans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the Dark Continent, Patrick 
Brantlinger discusses late nineteenth-century scientific justifications of-
107 [d. at 202. 
108 [d. at 205. 
109 [d. at 206. 
IIO [d. 
III [d. at 207. 
II2 [d. at 127. 
m [d. at 230. 
II4 [d. at 243. The term "fortune" emphasizes the imperial nature of Leo and Holly's 
quest; they have come to Africa in search of whatever of value they might acquire (power, 
knowledge, eternal youth). 
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fered by eugenicists and social Darwinists, not only for imperialism, but 
also for genocide. Arguing that these two ideas were inseparable, 
Brantlinger comments that "whereas imperialism could be lavishly praised 
in public, open support for the liquidation of 'inferior' races was another 
matter."l1S In the novel, Ustane's murder represents this unspeakable side 
of imperialism, and a troubling footnote that Holly adds to his manu-
script, months after he has completed it, enacts the justifications of geno-
cide that were the sub text of the social discourse of Empire. 
In Holly's manuscript, after recounting Ustane's murder and de-
scribing Ayesha as "a mysterious creature of evil tendencies," Holly 
adds: 
After some months of consideration of this statement I am 
bound to confess that I am not quite satisfied of its truth. It is 
perfectly true that Ayesha committed a murder, but I shrewdly 
suspect that, were we endowed with the same absolute power, 
and if we had the same tremendous interest at stake, we should 
be very apt to do likewise in parallel circumstances. 116 
Ayesha's tremendous interest was her empire, both Kallikrates ("my em-
pire shall be all my own") and her African empire. ll7 Months later back 
in England, far removed from the dead body of Ustane, Holly recharac-
terizes Ayesha as justified (she had so much at stake) rather than evil. 
Edward Said sees in British literature: 
[A] consistency of concern ... that fixes socially desirable, em-
powered space in metropolitan England or Europe and connects 
it by design, motive, and developments to distant or peripheral 
worlds (Ireland, Venice, Africa, Jamaica), conceived of as desir-
able but subordinate. And with these meticulously maintained 
references come attitudes-about rule, control, profit and en-
hancement and suitability .... liS 
liS Patrick Brantlinger, Victorians and Africans: The Genealogy of the Myth of the 
Dark Colltinent, in "RACE:' WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 185,205 (Henry Louis Gates ed., 
1986). To support this argument, Brantlinger cites Benjamin Kidd's 1894 Social Evolution: 
"The Anglo-Saxon has exterminated the less developed peoples with which he has come 
into competition ... through the operations of laws not less deadly [than war] and even 
more certain in their result. The weaker races disappear before the stronger through the 
effects of mere contact." BENJAMIN KIDD, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 46 (1894). Brantlinger also 
analyzes Darwin's 1874 The Descent of Man, concluding that "Darwinism lent scientific 
status to the view that there were higher and lower races, progressive and non progressive 
ones, and that the lower races ought to be governed by-or even completely supplanted 
by-civilized, progressive races like the British." Brantlinger, supra at 206. 
116 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 242 n.1. 
117 [d. at 202. 
118 SAID, supra note 101, at 52. 
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One wonders what structures of attitude and reference become culturally 
encoded when murders of "subject races" are so readily excused in the 
name of the tremendous interest of empire. 119 
Near the end of the novel, Ayesha says that they must travel to Eng-
land to "'live as it becometh us to live."'12o They shall overthrow Queen 
Victoria and destroy any tyrants who will stand in the way of Kallikrates' 
(and her own) rule. Holly informs her that "in England 'blasting' was not 
an amusement that could be indulged in with impunity, and that any such 
attempt would meet with the consideration of the law and probably end 
upon a scaffold."121 She responds, laughing with scorn, "'The law ... the 
law! Canst thou not understand, oh Holly, that I am above the law, and so 
shall my Ka1likrates be also?"'122 
While confessing that it made him "absolutely shudder to think what 
would be the result of her arrival there [in England]," Holly ultimately 
concludes that an all-powerful British Empire would be worth the great 
cost, including, it seems, the "terrible sacrifice of life" that the text has 
rehearsed in Ayesha's blasting of Ustane: 
In the end she would, I had little doubt, assume absolute rule 
over the British dominions, and probably over the whole earth, 
and, though I was sure that she would speedily make ours the 
most glorious and prosperous empire that the world has ever 
seen, it would be at the cost of a terrible sacrifice of life .... 
What was the meaning of it all? After much thinking I could 
only conclude that this wonderful creature ... was now about to 
be used by Providence as a means to change the order of the 
world, and possibly, by the building up of a power that could no 
more be rebelled against or questioned than the decrees of Fate, 
to change it materially for the better. l23 
But while Holly's (Britain's) unbridled lust for power may be ac-
ceptable (the desire to make "ours the most glorious and prosperous em-
pire that the world has ever seen"), an all-powerful She is not. I24 As 
Gilbert explains, Ayesha had to be destroyed by the Pillar of Life, the 
"fiery signifier whose eternal thundering return speaks the inexorability 
of the patriarchal Law She has violated in her satanically overreaching 
ambition."I25 As figuratively played out in the courtroom scene, where 
119 See generally WENDY R. KATZ, RIDER HAGGARD AND THE FICTION OF EMPIRE 131-
54 (1987) (discussing the racism in She and other imperial fiction by Haggard). 
120 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 254. 
121 Id. at 255. 
122 /d. 
123 /d. at 256. 
124Id. (emphasis added). 
125 Gilbert, supra note 42, at 130. 
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She sat "above them all," Ayesha's opposition to "the eternal [patriarchal] 
Law" had to be foreclosed. 126 Even in the context of Empire, She was too 
much of an exception. And with Ayesha's devolution at the end of the 
novel from "the loveliest, noblest, most splendid woman the world has 
ever seen"127 into literally a "hideous little monkey frame,"128 the text 
spectacularly clarifies that ultimately, "She" is not a "person." 
III. MARY SLESSOR: WHITE QUEEN OF THE OKOYONG 
It seems a sudden shift from a raven-haired beauty with serpent-like 
grace, sharing fruit and conversation with an English gentleman, to a red-
headed missionary making her way barefoot through the African bush; 
from the imaginary land of imperial Kor and the Amahaggars to the real 
world of imperial England and the Okoyong; from the pages of an eroti-
cized imperial romance to accounts of the life of a missionary and mag-
istrate. However, the fictional Ayesha and the real-life Mary Slessor both 
ruled in Africa as "white queens" and judges. Their positions were in 
flagrant violation of the rules about women in public, political, and legal 
roles that were so vehemently defended and enforced back in Britain. 
Representations of Slessor, like those of Ayesha and other exceptional 
"shes," were overdetermined and inherently contradictory. A cross-
examination of the accounts of Slessor's real-life experiences, especially 
in her capacity as an appointed magistrate of the British government, 
brings to light compelling additional testimony concerning women, law, 
and power in the late nineteenth century. 
In 1876, Slessor sailed from Scotland, leaving behind a childhood 
clouded by extreme poverty and violence, to become a missionary in the 
Calabar region of Eastern Nigeria. It had been a dream of Slessor's 
mother that one of her sons be a missionary in Africa, but when all of her 
sons died, she supported Mary's desire to follow in the footsteps of Dr. 
David Livingstone, hero to both mother and daughter. After serving for 
twelve years in the base missionaries in Duke Town, Old Town, and 
Creek Town, Slessor was transferred inland, at her request, to live with 
the Okoyong. It took more than two years for her to persuade the mission 
officials to let her live with the Okoyong tribe, where it was rumored that 
"old customs when women were flogged to death for trivial offenses, 
branded with smouldering sticks like cattle, and dragged screaming to be 
buried with a chief' still prevailed. 129 Slessor's friends were "horrified" 
and tried to dissuade her from going, as did a group of traders who 
126 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 295. 
127 ld. at 294. 
128 ld. at 295. 
129 BUCHAN, supra note 15, at 82. 
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claimed the Okoyong were more in need of a gun-boat than a mission-
ary.130 
All such reports must be read within the context of the imperialist 
structures of attitude and reference that informed them, and with the un-
derstanding that with no writing back from the Okoyong, we have only 
one-sided accounts. While we cannot assess the actual threat to Slessor's 
safety, if any, posed by the Okoyong, we do know that Slessor's move-a 
woman going alone to live with an African tribe-was unprecedented. 
Slessor lived with the Okoyong from 1888 to 1902.131 During that 
time, she gained a reputation that was legendary in the Calabar region, 
and her fame soon spread to Britain. Mary Kingsley, who made a special 
trip to meet Mary Slessor, wrote the following about Slessor in her 1897 
travel narrative, Travels in West Africa: 
Her great abilities, both physical and intellectual, have given her 
among the savage tribe an unique position, and won her, from 
white and black who know her, a profound esteem. Her knowl-
edge of the native, his language, his ways of thought, his dis-
eases, his difficulties, and all that is his, is extraordinary, and the 
amount of good she has done, no man can fully estimate. 132 
While many tales of Slessor and the Okoyong circulated, I would like to 
focus on two particular narratives: the first is an account of Slessor in her 
position as Her Majesty's Vice-Consul and District Magistrate; the sec-
ond comes from Kingsley's Travels in West Africa. 133 In 1890, Sir Claude 
Macdonald was appointed Her Majesty's Special Commissioner and 
Consul-General and, in an effort to expand the authority of the British 
government in the Calabar region, he began to appoint Vice-Consuls to 
supervise native courts. Because of her knowledge of the customs and 
laws of the Okoyong, Macdonald sought to appoint Slessor as Vice-
Consul and District Magistrate. This was not a popular decision. Sles-
sor's missionary colleagues criticized her for being so involved with gov-
ernment affairs; moreover, Caroline Oliver remarks that her colleagues 
"were shocked at her involving herself in anything so heathen and some-
130/d. at 87. 
131 In 1902, Slessor moved further inland to Enyong Creek. She accepted an appoint-
ment in 1905 as a Member of the Itu Native Court with the status of permanent vice-
president. She received forty-eight pounds per annum for her services. W.P. LIVINGSTONE, 
MARY SLESSOR OF CALABAR: PIONEER MISSIONARY 236 (8th ed. 1917). 
132 MARY KINGSLEY, TRAVELS IN WEST AFRICA 19 (Elspeth Huxley ed., 1987) (1897). 
133 Most of these tales are compiled in Livingstone's biography of Slessor. He includes 
information from her correspondence, from the correspondence of government officials 
and other missionaries, as well as articles published in the Mission Record. In 1915, Liv-
ingstone compiled a collection of her "voluminous correspondence," which unfortunately 
was destroyed in World War II. BUCHAN, sllpra note IS, at viii. 
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times obscene as native customs."I34 Some members of the government 
were not too pleased either. Oliver reports that Sir Clement Hill at the 
Foreign Office "was outraged at the idea of a woman holding such office 
"135 
Nevertheless, Slessor was offered and accepted the appointment and 
presided over the local Okoyong courts within the context of the Doctrine 
of Repugnancy, which "recognized native law and custom except insofar 
as they were repugnant to civilised standards of natural law and jus-
tice."136 A well-known account of Slessor is T.D. Maxwell's description 
of her presiding over the Okoyong court. He was the Chief Magistrate at 
Calabar, and was visiting in an official capacity. He relates the following 
first impression of Slessor: 
What sort of woman I expected to see I hardly know; certainly 
not what I did. A little frail old lady with a lace or lace-like 
shawl over her head and shoulders (that must, I think, have been 
a concession to a stranger, for I never saw the thing again), 
swaying herself in a rocking-chair and crooning to a black baby 
in her arms.137 
Maxwell had traveled to see the first woman in the British Empire to 
be appointed a magistrate, a lay position which carried an enormous 
amount of real legal power, especially in the colonies. A woman in her 
position must have been almost impossible for him to imagine, as he 
makes clear by his own comment, "[w]hat sort of woman I expected to 
see I hardly knoW."138 As with Holly's description of Ayesha in the court-
room, he cannot imagine a woman "in that space."\39 
The rest of Maxwell's description is an attempt to negotiate the cul-
tural paradox of Slessor as magistrate, and to do so he calls on various 
images of women. In the end, however, these representations do not add 
up to any coherent picture. At first, he describes her as a "little frail old 
lady" in a rocker (much like Helene Vacaresco's description of Queen 
Victoria). This is a very strange description of a woman in her early for-
ties, who, pictures show, had not aged prematurely. He also, however, 
presents her as a mother figure; she is crooning to a baby in her arms. 
Later, the queen/mother image conflates as he describes Slessor taking 
134 CAROLINE OLIVER, WESTERN WOMEN IN COLONIAL AFRICA 120 (1982). 
135 [d. 
136 [d. 
137 This description is quoted in LIVINGSTONE, supra note 131, at 131. The biography 
does not cite a source for Maxwell's account, but it does set it out in full. 
138 [d. 
139 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 174. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 246 2001
246 Harvard Women's Law Journal [VoI. 24 
her position at the front of the court, "surrounded by several ladies and 
babies-in-waiting."I40 
Then the description abruptly shifts; there is a change in both the 
tone of the passage and in the presentation of Slessor. Maxwell reports as 
follows: 
Suddenly she jumped up with an angry growl: her shawl fell off, 
the baby was hurriedly transferred to some one [sic] qualified to 
hold it, and with a few trenchant words she made for the door 
where a hulking, overdressed native stood. In a moment she 
seized him by the scruff of the neck, boxed his ears, and hustled 
him out into the yard .... 141 
This is the same "little frail old lady" he was describing only a few 
sentences before; now she is manhandling a hulking "local monarch of 
sorts."142 It is as if Maxwell suddenly remembers that he is describing a 
Vice-Consul of the British Crown. As such, neither an old woman nor a 
mother seems appropriate. Instead, he needs to show her as a powerful 
representative of the British government who is capable of using what-
ever means necessary to maintain order; she is commended for using 
violence against one who had "defied her orders."143 
But only a few lines later, he again undercuts Slessor's authority by 
suggesting that her court and her brand of justice are outside the "real" 
realm of law. Beginning with what sounds like high praise ("I have had a 
good deal of experience of Nigerian Courts of various kinds, but have 
never met one which better deserves to be termed a Court of Justice than 
that over which she presided"), he then comments that the "litigants em-
phatically got justice-sometimes, perhaps, like Shylock, 'more than 
they desired'-and it was essential justice unhampered by legal techni-
calities."I44 Of course, Shylock's justice came at the hands of Portia, sug-
gesting that Maxwell's assessment is influenced by the gender of this 
particular magistrate.145 In any event, it is certainly peculiar for a chief 
magistrate (one who handles appeals) to seem unconcerned that one of 
the courts under his jurisdiction is "unhampered by legal technicalities." 
Either the fact that the litigants are members of the Okoyong tribe or that 





145 A character in Shakespeare's sixteenth-century play The Merchant o/Venice, Portia 
(dressed as a man) presides as judge over the proceeding to determine whether Shylock 
could enforce a contractual remedy of a pound of flesh. See Julie Hankey, Victoriall Por-
tias: Shakespeare's Borderline Heroine, 45 SHAKESPEARE Q. 426 (1994) (discussing a 
wide array of Victorian representations of Portia). 
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the magistrate is a woman (or, most likely, some combination of the two) 
led him to consider this amazing admission of little consequence. 
In many respects, Maxwell seems unable to take Slessor or the busi-
ness of her court seriously. In another example he provides of one of 
Slessor's judicial decisions, he portrays her more like a mother resolving 
a squabble among children than a magistrate settling disputes among liti-
ga~ts: 
A sued B for a small debt. B admitted owing the money, and the 
Court (that is "Ma") ordered him to pay accordingly: but she 
added, "A is a rascal. He treats his mother shamefully, he ne-
glects his children, only the other day he beat one of his wives 
with quite unnecessary vehemence, yes and she was B's sister 
too, his farm is a disgrace, he seldom washes .... On the other 
hand, B was thrifty and respectable, so before B paid the 
amount due he would give A a good sound caning in the pres-
ence of everybody."l46 
Unfortunately, we do not know A or B's side of the story or how the 
"local monarch of sorts" felt about Slessor's adjudicative style or British 
justice in general. A cross-examination of Maxwell's testimony, however, 
does illuminate that a high-ranking official in the British government 
viewed the Okoyong people as unruly children, undeserving of names, 
and as sources of comic relief. Both Slessor and the Okoyong are de-
meaned by this testimony because, by suggesting that she is not a "real" 
judge, it implies that the problems of the Okoyong are not of sufficient 
import to require one. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that A 
and B, and the local monarch were not given the choice of rejecting all 
forms of British judgment and authority. Also, apparently uncomfortable 
designating Slessor as "the Court;' Maxwell inserts the parenthetical 
"(that is 'Ma')," which works to enhance the image of mother and chil-
dren playing law. 
While often referred to as "Ma," another of Slessor's familiar titles 
was the "White Queen of the Okoyong." Working to both negotiate and 
obscure the complexity of Slessor's position (in terms of gender, race, 
and power), this name was particularly popular among the white men's 
clubs in Africa.147 Much more acceptable as "Ma," a "pioneer mission-
146 LIVINGSTONE, supra note 131, at 131-32. 
147 OLIVER, supra note 134, at 135-36. Buchan reports that the Africans called Slessor 
"Eka Kpukpro Owo--'Mother of All The Peoples.'" BUCHAN, supra note 15, at xii. Liv-
ingstone also quotes a missionary as saying, "[h]er power is amazing; she is really Queen 
of the whole Okoyong district." LIVINGSTONE, supra note 131, at 183. Livingstone refers 
to Slessor as the White Queen of the Okoyong several times in his biography, and he actu-
ally uses that as the title of the children's biography he wrote about her. W.P. LIVING-
STONE, THE WHITE QUEEN OF OKOYONG: MARY SLESSOR-A TRUE STORY OF ADVEN-
TURE, HEROISM AND FAITH (1916). 
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ary," or even "a white queen," Slessor's identity as a woman with real 
legal power was effectively unrepresented. 148 
As a final comment on Slessor, it is interesting to see what another 
atypical nineteenth-century woman had to say about her. Mary Kingsley, 
who traveled through Africa "as a lone she-wolf," provides an account of 
Slessor that serves in certain respects as a cross-examination of Max-
well's account. 149 Kingsley is most interested in Slessor's work in saving 
twin babies, who, she explains, were believed to be evil. 150 Visiting after 
Maxwell, she describes the following incident that took place while she 
was with Slessor: 
Miss Slessor had heard of the twins' arrival and had started off, 
barefooted and bareheaded, at that pace she can go down a bush 
path. By the time she had gone four miles she met the proces-
sion, the [mother] coming to her and all the rest of the village 
yelling and howling behind her. On the top of her head was the 
gin-case, into which the children had been stuffed .... Needless 
to say, on arriving Miss Slessor took charge of affairs, relieving 
the unfortunate, weak, staggering woman from her load and car-
rying it herself, for no one else would touch it, or anything be-
longing to those awful twin things .... 151 
In this account, Slessor is no frail woman in a rocker, but a woman able 
to race more than four miles through a bush path, barefooted, and then 
take on a heavy load and walk back. Kingsley reports that, on the way 
home, Slessor waited while the villagers cut a new path to her house be-
cause she knew that if she took the twins down the main market road it 
would never be used again.152 While much can be said about Slessor's 
"interference" with tribal laws and customs, Kingsley's representation 
does work to discredit any implication in Maxwell's testimony that Sles-
sor does not take the Okoyong people and their beliefs seriously. 
Kingsley does not mention that Slessor is a magistrate (however, she 
also does not mention that she is a missionary). Rather than referring to 
her as "Ma" or a "white queen," she claims that Slessor "rules" the 
148 Livingstone's biography is entitled MARY SLESSOR OF CALABAR: PIONEER MIs-
SIONARY. It was not until Caroline Oliver entitled her chapter on Slessor in her 1982 book, 
Western Women in Colonial Africa, "Mary SIess or: Missionary and Magistrate," that Sles-
sor's position as a magistrate was given any prominence. 
149 Elspeth Huxley, Introduction to Kingsley, supra note 132, at 5. While Kingsley 
crosses boundaries that enable her to represent a women with power, her views are steeped 
in imperialist structures of attitude and reference. 
150 Buchan provides more specific information on why the twins were killed. 
Specifically, the Efiks and other Cross River tribes "believed that one twin was the child of 
a devil which secretly mated the mother, and since it was impossible to tell which was the 
devil's baby both must die." BUCHAN, supra note 15, at 55. 
151 KINGSLEY, supra note 132, at 189. 
152Id. at 189-90. 
HeinOnline -- 24 Harv. Women’s L.J. 249 2001
2001] Alice in Legal Wonderland 249 
Okoyong "as a veritable white chief."153 While the idea of white superi-
ority is prevalent in Kingsley's account, it is interesting that she repre-
sents Slessor in a male role. Kingsley concludes her narrative on Slessor 
by noting, "[t]his instance of what one white can do would give many 
important lessons in West Coast administration and development. Only 
the sort of man Miss Slessor represents is rare."154 
In the nineteenth century, figures like Miss Slessor were difficult to 
represent. The identities available to women were not adequate to repre-
sent women in politically powerful positions. In an effort not to diminish 
what she saw as the importance of Slessor's work and accomplishments, 
her real power, Kingsley apparently decides that the only way to imply 
the true nature of Slessor's power is to refer to her as a "man." 
IV. WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: "SHE" MAKES IT 
While Slessor was handing out justice a continent away, women in 
Britain were still trying to get a foot in the door. In 1903, Bertha Cave 
applied to be called to the Bar of Gray's Inn. When the Benchers of the 
Inn refused her admission, she appealed their decision. It took a special 
tribunal (composed of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, and 
five other justices) just five minutes to determine that there was no 
precedent for ladies being called to the English Bar and to aver their un-
willingness to establish one.155 
In December of 1912, Miss Bebb, after completing her studies at 
Oxford University, submitted notice to the Law Society of her intention 
to sit for their February examination, and enclosed the required fee. As 
had happened in the late 1870s, she was told not to present herself for 
examination, "giving the reason that she was a woman."156 However, 
much had changed since those earlier petitions. Women in Britain had 
been actively fighting for greater rights and powers under the law, and in 
1913, Bebb's case was championed and supported by several feminist 
groups.157 Bebb brought a lawsuit against the Law Society, asking the 
IS3 [d. at 19. 
154 [d. (emphasis added). 
ISS THE LAW TIMES, Dec. 5, 1903, at 107. Cave told the press that she would proceed 
to seek admission to the rolls as a solicitor and would study for a law degree at the Univer-
sity of London. While the professional bodies only allowed men as members, women were 
able to earn degrees in law at universities. BRIAN ABEL-SMITH & ROBERT STEVENS, LAW-
YERS AND THE COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 1750-
1965, at 192-93 (1967). 
156 Bebb v. Law Society, 1 Ch. 286 (Eng. C.A. 1914). 
157 See SUSAN KINGSLEY KENT, SEX AND SUFFRAGE IN BRITAIN, 1860-1914 (1987), 
for an excellent study of the feminist movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. As Kent argues, "[t]he ultimate source and embodiment of patriarchal power was 
seen to lie in political expression, or law, and the vote was perceived as a strategic tool for 
changing law. Thus, the demand for women's enfranchisement was a direct strike at the 
very seat and symbolic locus of patriarchal power." [d. at 13. Bebb's case was another such 
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court to declare that she was a "person" within the meaning of the 1843 
Solicitors' Act, and thus should be allowed to practice law. ISS 
The arguments in this case will sound familiar. Bebb's attorney of-
fered examples of many public offices held by women-Keeper of the 
Great Seal, Constable of England, Marshal and Great Chamberlain, gov-
erness of a workhouse, sexton, churchwarden-and, of course, "there 
have been Queens of England."ls9 He also offered specific evidence that 
women, in England in the past, had acted as attorneys.l60 Finally, he 
quoted the Solicitors' Act itself, which provided that any "person" com-
plying with specified conditions was entitled to be admitted as a solici-
tor-Bebb met all of the qualifications and thus, was such a person. The 
Solicitors' Act even included a provision stating that words importing the 
masculine gender were to apply to a female unless "there be something 
in the subject or context repugnant to such construction."161 
Arguing that "[e]ver since attorneys have been established as a pro-
fession, women have been deemed disqualified to act as attorneys," the 
defense found it repugnant to construe the statute to include Bebb as a 
"person."162 And, of course, they confidently invoked that popular refrain, 
"[t]he practice which has been followed for hundreds of years is a con-
clusive answer to the appellant's claim."163 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the defense, citing the unim-
peachable Lord Coke as its primary authority: "Lord Coke ... 300 years 
ago said that a woman is not allowed to be an attorney .... [A]nd the 
opinion of Lord Coke on the question of what or what is not the common 
law is one which requires no sanction from anybody else."I64 In light of 
this common law tradition, the judge dismissed the examples offered by 
Bebb's attorney of the many public offices that women had held in the 
past as "a most interesting discussion as to what women can do" but "be-
side the mark."165 One of the other appellate judges, quoting Chorlton as 
strike. 
158 Solicitors' Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 73 (Eng.). 
159 Bebb, 1 Ch. at 287. 
160 His examples of women attorneys were from the fourteenth century. The attorney 
also noted that women were permitted to practice law in many of Britain's colonies, as 
well as in foreign countries. ld. at 289. While he did not offer specific information, it is 
true that women were lawyers elsewhere. In Canada, Clara Brett Martin was admitted as 
both a solicitor and a barrister in 1897. Women were allowed to be lawyers in Australia as 
early as 1903, and Ellen Melville set up practice in New Zealand in 1909. Christine Alice 
Corcos, Portia Goes to Parliament: Women and Their Admission to Membership ill the 
Ellglish Legal Profession, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 307, 323-326 (1998). In the United States, 
Arabella A. Mansfield was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1869. SACHS & WILSON, 
supra note 33, at 95. In France, legislation allowing women to enter the legal profession 
was passed in 1900. Corcos, supra at 326-27. 
161 Solicitors' Act, 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 73, § 48 (Eng.). 
162 Bebb, 1 Ch. at 290. 
1631d. at 289. 
164 ld. at 293-94 (Cozens-Hardy, M.R.). 
165 ld. at 294 (CozenS-Hardy, M.R.). 
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quoted in lex-Blake, reiterated the passage about exceptional instances 
being of "comparatively little weight, as opposed to uninterrupted usage 
to the contrary for several centuries."166 
Finally, Judge Phillimore, after paying due homage to Coke-"He is 
only a witness, no doubt, as to the common law, but he is a witness of the 
highest authority"-"explained" away the exceptions to uninterrupted 
usage offered by Bebb's attorney as follows: "The cases as to women 
holding certain parochial offices have been distinguished, on the very 
occasions when the possibility of their holding them has been upheld, on 
the ground of there being offices which, in the view of the Courts, were 
suitable to women."167 With this statement, judicial bias is all but de-
clared. Uninterrupted usage may be interrupted, indeed, has been-not 
only through legislative initiatives, but by judges-but only when the 
exceptions have been judged "suitable." Stuttering over his own written 
words, Phillimore fumbles through the rest of this discussion ("I do not 
say ... what I say is .... "), at last resorting to a common and "safe" le-
gal out: "The cases as to parochial offices may stand on their own merits; 
they have really no bearing on this case."168 Thus, the evidence that calls 
into question the common law tradition is dismissed as irrelevant. 
After Bebb was denied status as a "person" under ,the Solicitors' Act, 
a Committee for the Admission of Women to the Solicitors' Profession 
enlisted the support of the Lord Chancellor and the government, and a 
bill was introduced to enable women to become solicitors. The Law So-
ciety opposed this legislation, and the outbreak of World War I put the 
issue temporarily on hold. 169 
In both 1917 and 1918, Lord Buckmaster introduced bills to admit 
women to the legal profession, but was opposed by both the Law Society 
and the Bar. After women's substantial contributions to the war effort, 
however, there was wide support for feminist initiatives, and when in 
1919 it became clear that there was strong government backing for 
opening up the legal profession to women, the Law Society voted to re-
move all obstacles that kept women from practicing.170 Later that same 
year, the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act was passed, expressly per-
mitting women who had received a law degree, or whose studies entitled 
them to one, to serve articles and be admitted and enrolled as solicitors. 171 
This Act further provided: 
A person shall not be disqualified by sex or marriage from the 
exercise of any public function, or from being appointed to or 
166 [d. at 296 (Swinfen Eady, LJ.). 
167 [d. at 298-99 (Phillimore, LJ.). 
168 [d. at 299. 
169 BIRKS, supra note 40, at 277. 
170 ABEL-Sr.UTH & STEVENS, supra note 154, at 193. 
171 Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 71 (Eng.). 
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holding any civil or judicial office or post, or from entering or 
assuming or carrying on any civil profession or vocation, or for 
admission to any incorporated society ... and a person shall not 
be exempted by sex or marriage from the liability to serve as ju-
ror.l72 
Thus, women were also admitted to the Inns of Court. 173 
Carrie Morrison became the first woman to be admitted as a solicitor 
in 1922,174 and in that same year, Ivy Williams became the first woman 
called to the Bar.175 In the political realm, the 1918 Representation of the 
People Act gave the right to vote to women over thirty who were either 
householders, wives of householders, or had a university education. 176 
The 1918 Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act granted women the 
right to be elected, sit, and vote as members of the Commons House of 
Parliament. I77 In 1919, Nancy Astor became the first woman to sit in the 
House of Commons. Women were not granted the right to sit in the 
House of Lords unti11958. 178 Margaret Bondfield became the first woman 
Cabinet member when she was appointed Minister of Labour in 1929. 
172 [d. § 1. 
173 A bill relating specifically to barristers, the Barristers and Solicitors (Qualification 
of Women) Bill, does not appear to have passed. However, the 1919 Sex Disqualification 
(Removal) Act accomplished the same end. Corcos, supra note 160, at 386. Helena Kep-
nedy comments that "[ilt was not until the passage of the Sex Disqualification (Removal) 
Act of 1919 that the admission of women was forced upon the Inns by Parliament, and 
since that date the acceptance of women has continued to be slow and grudging." Helena 
Kennedy, Women at the Bar, in THE BAR ON TRIAL 148 (Robert Hazell ed., 1978) See gen-
erally id. at 148-62 (discussing women at the Bar in the late twentieth century). 
174 No mention of this first admission was made in the legal papers, and The Law Soci-
ety Gazette continued to list names of women under the heading "Gentlemen Applying for 
Admission" for some time. HARRY KIRK, PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION: A HISTORY OF THE 
SOLICITOR'S PROFESSION, 1100 TO THE PRESENT DAY 111 (1976). See generally ABEL, 
supra note 41, at 172-76 (discussing women's numbers and roles as solicitors from the 
1920s to the present). 
175 See generally ABEL, supra note 41, at 80-85 (discussing women's numbers and 
roles within the Bar from the 1920s to the present). Cornelia Sorabji, an Indian woman 
who studied law at Somerville College, Oxford from 1889 to 1892, also qualified for the 
bar in 1922. By the 1930s, she was an internationally known barrister. ANTOINETTE BUR-
TON, AT THE HEART OF THE EMPIRE: INDIANS AND THE COLONIAL ENCOUNTER IN LATE-
VICTORIAN BRITAIN 4 (1998). See generally id. at 110-51 (discussing Sorabji's experience 
studying law at Oxford). 
176 Representation of the People Act, 1918,7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 64 (Eng.). This legislation 
gave the vote to six million out of thirteen million adult women. JOAN PERKIN, VICTORIAN 
WOMEN 243 (1993). Universal suffrage for women was not attained until 1928 with the 
passage of the Representation of the People (Equal Franchise) Act, 1928, 18 & 19 Geo. 5, 
c. 12 (Eng.). 
In Parliament (Qualification of Women) Act, 1918, 8 & 9 Geo. 5, c. 47 (Eng.). Perkin 
suggests that the influence of women members of Parliament, as well as millions of women 
voters, prompted the passage of sixteen acts protecting women's interests in the early 
1920s. PERKIN, supra note 175, at 244. 
178 For a history of the legal battle of women to gain access to the House of Lords, es-
pecially the key role played by Margaret Haig Thomas Mackworth, Viscountess Rhondda, 
see SHIRLEY M. EOFF, VISCOUNTESS RHONDDA, EQUALITARIAN FEMINIST (1991). 
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In 1962, Elizabeth Lane became the first woman appointed as a 
judge in England when Lord Chancellor Dilhorne appointed her to the 
County Court Bench. In 1965, she was appointed to the High Court 
Bench.179 Lane tells her own story in Hear the Other Side: The Autobiog-
raphy of England's First Woman Judge. lso At long last, women in power-
ful legal and political roles were able to judge for themselves how they 
might best be represented.181 
CONCLUSION 
When Holly first glimpses Ayesha behind the curtain, he ponders: 
"Who could be behind it?-some naked savage queen, a languishing Ori-
ental beauty, or a nineteenth-century young lady, drinking afternoon tea? 
I had not the slightest idea, and should not have been astonished at seeing 
any of the three."182 Similarly, T.D. Maxwell had no idea what to expect 
of Slessor: "What sort of woman I expected to see I hardly knoW."183 In 
the late nineteenth century, because women allegedly had no "public 
functions" and because women under laws conferring power were not 
"persons," it is no surprise that Holly and Maxwell had no idea what to 
expect when about to come face to face with these "exceptional" women. 
Munich has argued that the "cultural paradox of Queen Victoria's 
specific kind of monarchy-the apparent contradiction of a devoted wife, 
prolific mother, and extravagant widow who is also Queen of an Empire 
upon which the sun never sets,"I84 resulted in "a fragmentation of sym-
bolization, representations in which all possibilities are entertained ... 
the representation of excess or the excess of representation."185 Similarly, 
in trying to represent Ayesha and Slessor, the narrators respond with a 
plethora of oftentimes contradictory images. Holly, over the course of his 
narrative, presents Ayesha as all of the possibilities he imagined. In vari-
ous contexts, she is naked, savage, a queen, languishing, Oriental (in 
Saidian terms), a beauty, young (at least looking), and a lady. Maxwell 
also responds to the unorthodox Slessor with a superfluity of representa-
tions. In the space of two pages, he presents her as young and old, fierce 
and docile, maternal and childish. Ultimately, taking into account the 
179 This meant Lane was also appointed a Bencher at her Inn of Court, making her the 
first woman to sit on the very prestigious governing body of an Inn. DAME ELIZABETH 
LANE, HEAR THE OTHER SIDE: AUD! ALTERAM PARTEr-I: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ENG-
LAND'S FIRST WOMAN JUDGE 136-37 (1985). 
ISO ld. 
lSI For a probing and reflective analysis of the influence women have had on the law 
and the legal process in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see the chapter 
"Women as Citizens" in SUSAN ATKINS & BRENDA HOGGETT, WOMEN AND THE LAW 181-
99 (1984). 
182 HAGGARD, supra note 43, at 141. 
183 LIVINGSTONE, supra note 131, at 131. 
184 Munich, supra note 75, at 265. 
185 ld. at 268-69. 
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context of his visit, which was to review the performance of one of the 
British government's appointed magistrates, he opts for presenting a ma-
ternal image, "the Court (that is 'Ma')" presiding over infantalized Afri-
cans (possibly drawing on the strength of that image from the anomalous 
royal Court of Queen Victoria). 
In the "person" cases, Lord Coke was the star witness, bearing tes-
timony over the centuries as to women's uninterrupted and thus "right-
fully" continued exclusion from public, political, and professional roles. 
Reading these legal decisions through the lens of feminist jurisprudence, 
which as Lucinda Finley explains, "tells us to look at things in their his-
torical, social, and political context, including power and gender; distrust 
abstractions and universal rules, because 'objectivity' is really perspec-
tived and abstractions just hide the biases; question everything, especially 
the norms and assumptions implicit in received doctrine [precedent],"186 
we can see clearly that the judges, while literally sitting in judgment, also 
were very much passing judgment upon those "shes" whom they believed 
to be overreaching in their ambitions. 
It is important to women's legal history to examine narratives of the 
past that explored women's relationship to the law, whether those be ju-
dicial opinions, statutes, government documents, or novels. As Gerda 
Lerner argues in The Creation of Patriarchy, the still-pervasive myths 
that women are marginal to history or mere victims of historical process 
have "profoundly affected the psychology of women."IS? A lack of "prece-
dent for significant action, heroism, or liberating example,"ls8 Lerner ex-
plains, makes it difficult to "imagine alternatives to existing conditions."189 
The "person" cases illustrate much more than women's systematic exclu-
sion from the law; they bring to knowledge the heroic efforts of women 
like Lady Sandhurst and Miss Bebb to change history. Novels such as 
She, which reinforced and constructed cultural ideas about race and gen-
der, provide useful contexts for understanding the complex role and rep-
resentations of a Victorian woman magistrate in Africa. Legal and liter-
ary narratives are important sources of women's legal history, whether 
they offer direct testimony of the significant and active roles that women 
have played in the historical process, or, upon cross-examination, offer a 
critical understanding of the existing social conditions to which many 
bold and daring Alices were imagining alternatives. 
186 Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Di/emma of the Gendered 
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886, 905 (1989). 
187 GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 221 (1986). 
188 [d. at 222. 
189 [d. at 223. 
